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Abstract
This document presents the analytical framework recently developed by the Banco de 
España for the implementation of its macroprudential policy. The methodology described 
uses a broad set of indicators that enables macroprudential risks to be monitored through 
risk mapping. This framework will provide support for the Banco de España’s broad 
macroprudential policy stance.
Keywords: early warning indicators, macroprudential policy stance, macroeconomic actual 
conditions.
JEL classifi cation: G21, G32.
Resumen
Este documento presenta el marco analítico desarrollado recientemente por el Banco de 
España para la puesta en marcha de su política macroprudencial. La metodología descrita 
incorpora un amplio conjunto de indicadores que permiten realizar un seguimiento de los 
riesgos macroprudenciales a través de un mapa de riesgos. El marco servirá de soporte 
para defi nir la orientación general de la política macroprudencial del Banco de España.
Palabras clave: indicadores de alerta temprana, orientiación de la política macroprudencial, 
condiciones macroeconómicas efectivas.
Códigos JEL: G21, G32.
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1 Introduction
The scope and severity of the latest bank crisis, together with its impact on the economy, has 
led to a far-reaching reform of the regulatory framework to which banks are subject. Regulatory 
capital requirements have been notably tightened, in terms both of the minimum level of capital 
required and of their composition, with priority now being given to the quality of capital (based 
on the new defi nition of regulatory capital, namely common equity Tier 1 (CET1)). In parallel, the 
development of a set of regulatory capital instruments is under way, the use of which would form 
part of so-called macroprudential policy. 
The aim of macroprudential policy is twofold. First, to contribute to checking the 
development of risks that may be systemic, affecting the whole of a country’s banking system; 
and, further, to strengthen banks’ solvency, generally through the construction of capital buffers 
enabling banks to be protected if, fi nally, the foregoing risks ultimately materialise. Macroprudential 
policy seeks, on one hand, to develop and apply instruments which enable the systemic risks 
that develop over the credit cycle to be reduced and withstood (the time dimension); and, on the 
other, to use another series of instruments with a cross-sectional dimension that has to do with 
the impact on systemic risk arising from the size, complexity and interconnectedness of banks 
(the structural cross-sectional dimension). 
Macroprudential policy is not new. There are examples of supervisory authorities that 
undertook measures in the past aimed at restricting systemic risk and safeguarding fi nancial 
stability. Spain, for instance, is a reference in the early use of macroprudential instruments and 
in the leadership role of the central bank in their development and implementation. The Banco 
de España developed and set in train 15 years ago dynamic or countercyclical provisioning, 
with the aim of protecting the banking system from a very pronounced and prolonged credit 
expansion, seeking to temper its effects both during the expansionary phase and during the 
subsequent contraction. 
Unlike monetary policy – where a developed theoretical and empirical analytical 
framework has been tried and tested over the decades1 – in the fi eld of macroprudential 
policy a full analytical framework has yet to be developed with well-defi ned and quantifi able 
fi nal objectives and a set of indicators and instruments of suffi ciently tested effectiveness. Also, 
uniform criteria are likewise lacking as to the institutional arrangements governing the defi nition 
and application of macroprudential policy and, in particular, as to the role the central bank, the 
microprudential supervisor and the government authorities should play. 
That said, Europe has paved the way for a set of policies aimed at protecting the 
stability of the fi nancial system, with such policies including instruments that enable systemic risk 
1  In monetary policy there is fairly widespread consensus as to its objective and how to avail oneself of intermediate 
targets, indicators, instruments, procedures and institutions to meet that objective.
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to be reduced and/or its impact – should it ultimately materialise – to be mitigated. Among these 
instruments, to cite some of those included in European solvency regulations (CRD IV, Directive 
2013/36/EU and CRR, Regulation (EU) 575/2013), are: the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB); 
capital buffers for systemic risk; capital buffers for globally and locally systemic institutions; and 
the adjustment in the calculation of risk-weighted assets. Outside these regulations there are also 
instruments available to national authorities, such as the limits on the amount lent based on the 
value of the collateral, or of the good acquired with that loan [loan-to-value ratios (LTV )], or limits 
based on the borrower’s income (debt-to-income ratios). Most of the instruments stemming 
from these European solvency regulations are voluntary, with the exception of the countercyclical 
capital buffer, which must be introduced before January 2016, and the treatment of domestic 
systemic institutions, which should also be announced before 2016. 
As to the institutional framework for governing the application of these instruments, 
Europe has set up a body called the ESRB – the European Systemic Risk Board – which, under 
the “comply or explain” principle, can issue warnings and recommendations to Member States, 
to central banks and to national and European supervisors alike. The ESRB draws together 
the European Union countries’ central banks and the national and European supervisory 
authorities of banks, of insurance and pension funds, and of securities and fi nancial markets. 
Recently, precisely following a 2013 ESRB recommendation, the majority of European countries 
have created a macroprudential authority entrusted with risk analysis and macroprudential 
policy formulation, choosing the most suitable instruments to safeguard fi nancial stability and 
reduce systemic risk. This macroprudential authority is structured differently in each country; 
but, generally, the central bank usually plays a leading role either because it is entrusted with 
providing analysis, because the instruments to be used fall within its remit and it is therefore 
designated to apply these instruments, or because it has veto power over the decisions of the 
macroprudential authority. 
With the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the European Central 
Bank has taken on competencies for the macroprudential policy pursued in the euro area. 
These competencies specifi cally entail the possibility of making the measures taken by national 
authorities more severe if they deem this advisable to protect fi nancial stability, or to ensure 
consistency in risk-pricing and in the use of macroprudential instruments in all countries. For 
example, if a country sets its countercyclical capital buffer at 1%, the ECB may raise it. This is 
also the case for other macroprudential instruments, where risk-identifi cation processes may be 
made stricter, extending for instance the list of institutions that the national authority classifi es as 
domestic systemic institutions. In this way the ECB could correct hypothetical inaction bias on 
the part of the national authorities. 
It is not surprising that, in relation to macroprudential policy, instruments and the 
institutional framework should have advanced notably in Europe, particularly in the euro area 
countries. The differences in respect of the business and fi nancial cycle across countries 
subject to a common monetary policy may generate asymmetrical risks requiring a different 
complementary policy (more or less active) from one country to another. This differential policy 
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would be macroprudential policy. Thus, if one country is facing excessive credit growth, with 
very low nominal and real interest rates that are suitable for the euro area as a whole but not for 
the country in question, that were to prompt an increase in systemic risk in that country, it would 
surely make sense to resort to the arsenal of macroprudential instruments to attempt to reduce 
this risk or, where appropriate, to increase the protection for banks if the risk were ultimately to 
materialise.
There are interactions and even potential overlapping between macroprudential policy 
and other policies. Hence, macroprudential instruments relating to capital interact with those 
used by the microprudential supervisor, which also adjusts requirements on the basis of the 
situation of each of its supervised banks. The objectives of both supervisors may be perfectly 
aligned since both seek to increase the resilience of banks and of the banking system as a 
whole. On occasions, however, they may clash. For instance, in the event of a substantial 
slowdown in the economy, the microprudential supervisor may wish to preserve banks’ capital, 
to withstand credit risk losses. The macroprudential supervisor, meanwhile, may be prepared to 
tolerate a reduction in capital ratios so that capital may be used to absorb losses and to prevent 
banks from reducing their supply of credit, in order to maintain the level of solvency, which might 
accentuate the economic contraction. 
At a more practical level, the analytical framework has progressed in recent years 
although, once more, there is still no widespread consensus on which risk indicators should 
be used and, more importantly, how to relate these indicators to the activation or deactivation 
of specifi c macroprudential instruments. However, national and supranational authorities are 
moving ahead in the defi nition of a wide range of instruments that take the specifi c form of 
so-called heat maps, which in turn offer information on the development of and changes in 
risks and, therefore, on the need to activate or deactivate macroprudential instruments. The 
Banco de España has recently been working on the development of a framework that includes 
a set of indicators that may offer guidance, along with expert judgement, on the direction and 
intensity of macroprudential policy, the selection of the most suitable instruments and their level 
of application. This framework will provide analytical support for the Banco de España’s broad 
macroprudential policy stance, but the specifi c analysis for the activation and calibration of each 
instrument will be conducted through specifi c studies and methodologies for each of them. 
Section 2 of this document briefl y describes the macroprudential instruments available 
to the Banco de España, with particular emphasis on the countercyclical capital buffer and the 
requirements for systemic institutions, both those of global importance and the rest. Section 3 
presents the macroprudential indicators that have recently been developed and the heat map 
aggregation methodology. Section 4 presents the heat map obtained from these indicators, with 
both a backward and forward-looking analysis to illustrate their functioning. Section 5 briefl y 
draws some conclusions. 
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2 Macroprudential instruments 
In step with the international progress in the development of macroprudential regulation in 
recent years, the Banco de España currently has a number of macroprudential instruments 
that should provide it with greater control in respect of the emergence of systemic risks in 
the future. As Table 1 shows, what are involved here are both capital instruments and liquidity 
instruments, or instruments that impact banks’ assets. A portion of the instruments stem 
from CRD IV, which has been transposed into national legislation (Law 10/2014 of 26 June 
2014 and Royal Decree 84/2015); others are from CRR (and directly applicable, not requiring 
transposition); and fi nally, some additional instruments would require implementation under 
national legislation. 
There follows a more detailed analysis of the CCB, which is obligatory from January 
2016, and the identifi cation of systemic institutions.
2.1 Countercyclical capital buffer (CCB)
The CCB is a macroprudential instrument introduced under the Basel III framework whose 
primary objective is to ensure that the banking sector as a whole has a pool of capital that 
builds up in the cyclical upturn and which, in the downturn, enables losses to be absorbed, with 
the aim of helping stabilise the fl ow of credit to the economy. It is an instrument designed to 
address the time dimension of systemic risks, in this case those arising from excessive growth 
in aggregate credit. 
The CCB regime, pursuant to the provisions of the European Directive and in line 
with Basel III, comes into force in January 2016. The setting of the level of the CCB follows 
a “guided (or bounded) discretion” approach, where, in addition to qualitative information 
and expert judgement, specifi c quantitative indicators are used as a source of guidance. 
In this respect, the initial benchmark quantitative indicator proposed by Basel III and also 
acknowledged in the European Directive and by the ESRB is the so-called credit-to-GDP 
gap. This indicator is calculated as the difference resulting from the ratio of total credit to the 
non-fi nancial private sector divided by gross domestic product, minus the long-term trend of 
this ratio, estimated by statistical procedures. Following the initial reference rule proposed 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the CCB would be activated when this 
indicator exceeded the threshold of 2% and it would attain a value of 2.5% when this indicator 
were 10%. 
Following the aforementioned guided discretion approach and given that the credit-
to-GDP gap does not function equally in all contexts and countries, the level of the CCB 
can be set taking into account various statistical specifi cations and other possible quantitative 
indicators (real estate sector indicators, measures of private-sector debt burden, measures
of external imbalances), along with other qualitative criteria (expert judgement, market 
information).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1601
2.2 Capital buffers for systemically important institutions
Additional capital requirements made of systemically important institutions seek to address 
macroprudential risks in their cross-sectional or structural dimension. Specifi cally, an additional 
capital buffer is required of the most systemically important institutions, both those considered 
globally important and those important at the national level. The aim thereby is to strengthen 
these institutions’ solvency to reduce the adverse externalities on the overall banking system 
that might result from their failure. Furthermore, this additional requirement should mitigate the 
moral hazard entailed by the size (“too-big-to-fail”) of some institutions, while it would offset 
the competitive advantage these institutions might have in the funding market due to their 
systemic nature and, therefore, the potential government support they may receive in the event 
of solvency diffi culties. 
For global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs), an internationally accepted 
methodology has been defi ned which allows them to be identifi ed and assigned a capital 
surcharge based on objective criteria. However, national supervisors may designate as global 
systemically important institutions those that fall below the lower quantitative threshold, provided 
there is good reason for doing so (supervisory judgement). The additional requirements will be 
phased in from 2016, the schedule calling for 25% in 2016, 50% and 2017, 75% in 2018 and 
100% in 2019. Also, from 2016, the Banco de España will identify other systemically important 
institutions (O-SIIs). To do so, it will apply the guidelines developed by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA/GL/2014/10) for identifying these institutions. This is a methodology also based 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The CRD IV (Capital Requirements Directive) has been transposed into Spanish legislation and the CRR (Capital Requirements Regulation) is directly applicable.
Instrument Legal basis Application Description
Countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) CRD: 130, 135-140 Compulsory Additional capital buffer built 
up in expansions to absorb losses 
in recessions.
Compulsory for  G-SIIs
Optional for O-SIIs
Systemic risk buffer (SRB) CRD: 133, 134 Optional Capital buffer to prevent and mitigate 
non-cyclical systemic risks not covered 
by the CRR.
Pillar 2 liquidity requirements CRD: 105 Optional Treatment of systemic liquidity risk through 
prudential liquidity charges.
Other macroprudential uses of Pillar 2 CRD: 103 Optional Treatment of systemic risks derived from 
????????? ???????????? ?????????????
Additional measures 
?????? ???????????????
CRR: 458 Optional Stricter requirements on capital, capital 
conservation buffer, liquidity, large 
exposures, disclosure and risk weights.
Higher risk weights and stricter  
criteria for real estate loans
CRR: 124 Optional
Higher minimum LGDs CRR: 164 Optional
??????????????????????????????????????????
sector. The rationale is similar to that for 
the CCB, but applied to real estate.
Systemically important institutions CRD: 131 Additional capital buffer for externalities 
caused by global systemically important 
institutions (G-SIIs) and domestic 
systemically important institutions (O-SIIs).
MACROPRUDENTIAL INSTRUMENTS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE IN EUROPEAN AND SPANISH LEGISLATION (a) TABLE 1  
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on quantitative criteria, although it allows a certain degree of national discretion for the purpose of 
closer adaptation to the characteristics of the national banking system. All O-SIIs will be required to 
have a capital buffer, determined by the Banco de España, of up to 2% depending on the following 
factors: the degree of systemic importance; the need for activation given the particular position of 
each institution; and the general situation in terms of risks and the macroeconomic environment. 
2.3 Other instruments
The other instruments available, the use of which is optional, can supplement those described 
above to cover more fully the potential threats to the system. In particular, CRD IV allows 
the introduction of a systemic risk buffer to prevent and mitigate structural systemic risks by 
increasing the loss absorption capacity of the system or its components. It is a fl exible instrument 
which can be applied to the banking system as a whole or to a subset of banks. Accordingly, it 
is also a cross-sectional tool. Additionally, CRD IV also allows a macroprudential use of the Pillar 
2 tools available, such as capital surcharges or more transparent reporting.
For its part, the CRR provides fl exibility to impose, at the national level, stricter 
prudential requirements in a number of instruments, such as the capital conservation buffer, 
liquidity requirements or large exposures. The CRR also allows risk weights and loss given 
default (LGD) to be raised for the real estate development sector. These measures should only 
be applied when the national authority determines that the other instruments available cannot 
adequately control systemic risk. 
Lastly, although European legislation is silent in this respect, measures may be developed 
in national legislation to control the granting of credit through limits on the amount lent based on 
the collateral (loan-to-value or LTV) or on the debtor’s ability to pay (debt-to-income ratio or DTI). 
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3 Macroprudential indicators
Macroprudential policy requires monitoring and assessing the risks that threaten fi nancial 
stability. In this connection, the ESRB recommends linking macroprudential policy objectives to 
appropriate instruments and indicators (ESRB/2013/1 Recommendation C). Macroprudential 
indicators perform a dual role: on the one hand they monitor how risks that may arise in the 
fi nancial system evolve, and on the other they serve as a guideline for macroprudential policy 
decisions.
The Banco de España has recently developed a risk monitoring tool using a set of 
macroprudential indicators. For that purpose, it compiled information on a broad set of economic 
variables using aggregate data available to it. The methodology applied transforms this mass 
of information into a heat map that issues alerts on fi nancial system risks and, more specifi cally, 
on banking risks. The map is a tool for visualising possible sources of systemic risk and for 
monitoring how those risks evolve over time. A fl exible approach was followed to develop 
the indicators, so that new indicators may be added when other signifi cant data sources are 
identifi ed.
The methodology used exploits past experience of banking crisis episodes to study 
which indicators are capable of identifying them in advance. The indicators currently available 
(more than 100) have been structured around a series of categories that provides a better 
arrangement of the data. This classifi cation is summarised in Table 2, taking as its starting 
point the ESRB work that has identifi ed four intermediate macroprudential policy objectives, 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Credit growth and leverage
Credit: intensity, imbalances, leverage.
Housing market: prices, overvaluation.
Borrower debt-to-income ratio.
Transformation of maturities 
and market illiquidity
Bank assets.
Bank liabilities.
Imbalances in banks’ foreign currency exposure
Concentration
Reliance on bank lending in comparison with other sources 
????????????
Sectoral concentration.
Sovereign exposure.
Credit exposure in foreign currency.
Incentives and moral hazard
Risks at the tail of the distribution.
Systemic stress.
Macroeconomic imbalances
External dependence.
Fiscal imbalances.
Materialised risks 
Real economy.
NPLs and dependence on central bank.
CLASSIFICATION OF MACROPRUDENTIAL INDICATORS  TABLE 2  
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each with its own indicators. This work has been supplemented with two additional blocks of 
indicators, which are needed in the Banco de España’s opinion to complete the information on 
the macroprudential policy stance. 
Table 2 thus shows fi rst the indicators classifi ed on the basis of the four intermediate 
objectives defi ned by the ESRB: 
i) Mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage: category headed 
credit growth and leverage
 This category includes credit growth and leverage indicators: simple indicators, 
such as year-on-year rates of change in credit to different sectors, or house prices, 
and also more sophisticated indicators to assess the imbalance between these 
variables and possible long-term trends. Indicators measuring borrowers’ debt-
to-income ratios, which hinge, among other factors, on debt values, interest rates 
and disposable income, are also included.
ii) Mitigate and prevent excessive maturity mismatch and market illiquidity: category 
headed transformation of maturities and market illiquidity.
 The indicators belonging to this category aim to identify possible imbalances 
between banks’ assets and liabilities. As is known, the fundamental role of banks 
is to manage the risk posed by the fact that their assets generally have longer 
maturities than their liabilities. However, a widespread increase of this maturity 
mismatch may constitute a systemic risk. Here, it is also important to assess the 
presence of available liquid assets in stress situations, given that the loans are 
generally quite illiquid.
iii)  Limit direct and indirect exposure concentrations: category headed concentration.
 The indicators in this category monitor the credit exposure to different economic 
sectors, such as manufacturing industry, construction or real estate development. 
Excessive growth in the exposure to any one of those sectors might be a diffi cult 
risk to bear for banks if that sector were hit by a crisis. Other types of exposures 
are also considered, such as sovereign or foreign currency exposure.
iv) Limit the systemic impact of misaligned incentives with a view to reducing moral 
hazard: category headed incentives and moral hazard.
 This category encompasses a large amount of fi nancial market data, such as stock 
market returns, key interest rate spreads or fi nancial volatility estimates. Extreme 
values among these variables might encourage excessive risk-taking, or directly 
reveal that the risks are on the increase. Based on these data, more sophisticated 
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indicators are also generated to assess the scale of the so-called “tail risks“ of the 
distributions of different variables using fi nancial econometric models.
In addition to the indicators linked to the ESRB’s four intermediate objectives, the 
Banco de España has developed a fi fth category grouping indicators relating to macroeconomic 
imbalances, which cover a series of measures on the external fragility and fi scal imbalances of 
the Spanish economy. 
Lastly, a fi nal set of indicators refl ects the actual conditions in the economy and in 
the banking sector. In this case, it is not a question of indicators capable of issuing warnings 
alerting of potential risks in advance, but indicators that enable the position of the economy and 
of the banking sector within the macroeconomic and credit cycle to be assessed. Knowledge 
thereof is also essential as a guideline for macroprudential policy, as the measures to be adopted 
may vary considerably according to whether the economy is growing, in recession or fl at. 
Hence, knowing the position of the Spanish economy and of the banks in the cycle will enable 
macroprudential policy to be adjusted so as to avoid unwanted effects, for example in situations 
of weak economic growth and banking fragility. 
Some of the indicators grouped in the six categories described above directly use 
the data available, or a minimal transformation of these data (ratios of different variables or rates 
of change). Others, however, are derived from more sophisticated econometric modelling. The 
indicators are generally calculated with a quarterly frequency, although a sub set of indicators, 
which uses market data, is available with a weekly frequency. Historical data since 1971 are 
used, which allows for assessment of their behaviour in the banking crises experienced by the 
Spanish economy over the past 45 years, some of which may be classed as systemic. 
The original indicators bring together a very broad and diverse dataset. Accordingly, 
a systematic analysis methodology is advisable to ensure that the most signifi cant information 
is extracted. This may be achieved through two transformations in successive stages: the 
generation of a heat map, and its aggregation into a smaller-scale map to make it more useful 
as a guideline for macroprudential policy. 
In the fi rst stage, an extensive heat map is developed. This is generated by associating 
a level of alert with each value for the indicators. Table 3 summarises the possible levels of the 
alert. The indicators may be in a normal range of values (green colour coding), which does not 
pose a threat to the system. As an indicator departs from the normal range, the level of alert 
increases from a low level (yellow) to medium (orange) and fi nally the maximum level of alert 
(red). The thresholds of the levels of alert are calculated from the historical percentiles of the 
distribution of each indicator. Following international conventions, two types of indicators are 
distinguished: some indicators are one-tailed, since an increase in their value always signals 
greater vulnerability; other indicators at two-tailed, since both very high and very low values 
signal a risk to the system. An example of the fi rst type of indicator is the non-performing loans 
ratio, while an example of the second type is the rate of change of credit. 
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Once the general heat map has been constructed from a substantial number of 
indicators, the second stage consists of aggregating them. The level of the fi nancial system’s 
aggregate vulnerability is diffi cult to evaluate from direct observation of the indicators. For this 
reason, aggregation allows the main trends of the disaggregated information to be identifi ed more 
readily. In particular, the objective is to aggregate the individual series in a comprehensive heat 
map which refl ects the main categories described in Table 2. This is done by linear aggregation 
of the heat map, weighted by two adjustment factors. The fi rst adjustment factor takes into 
account the capacity of indicators to anticipate future crises, based on their behaviour in the years 
prior to the Spanish crises of the last 45 years. Hence, those indicators with greater predictive 
power will be weighted more highly in the aggregation. The second adjustment factor takes 
into account the correlation between different indicators. Some indicators may be correlated 
because they use similar information. To avoid the multiple counting of a single possible source 
of vulnerabilities, the weight of correlated indicators is reduced by assigning them a lower weight. 
Finally, before carrying out the aggregation, two-tailed indicators are converted into one-tailed 
indicators to ensure that all series fl uctuate in the same range of values. 
The fi nal result of the aggregation of the more than 100 indicators translates into fi ve 
categories of potential risks, in accordance with the fi rst fi ve blocks explained in Table 2. The 
fi rst four refl ect the ESRB’s intermediate objectives (credit growth and leverage, transformation 
of maturities and market liquidity, concentration of exposures, and incentives and moral hazard), 
to which is added the indicator summarising macroeconomic imbalances. These fi ve composite 
indicators are aggregated into a single fi nal indicator (aggregate assessment), supplemented 
by the indicators of the actual conditions in the economy and in the banking sector. Table 4 in 
the following section illustrates the aggregate heat map, with the aforementioned composition. 
One-tailed indicators
Normal range Low Medium High
Vulnerability
? + Increasing values
HEAT MAP COLOUR CODING  TABLE 3
Two-tailed indicators
High Medium Low Normal range Low Medium High
Vulnerability Vulnerability
Decreasing values - ? ?
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
+ Increasing values
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4 Heat map analysis
4.1 Backward-looking analysis 
Although the indicators have been subject to backward-looking assessment since the 1970s, for 
the sake of simplicity and in keeping with its merely illustrative purpose, this section focuses on 
the period from 1996 to the present. The aim is to show how the recently developed indicators 
would have behaved in the past. The illustrative nature of the section is reinforced as the stress 
is on exhaustively known and analysed events.
Following the crisis derived from the 1993 recession and the intervention of Banesto at 
the end of that year, the risk indicators were in the range considered to be normal (Table 4.A). 
However, the real economy was still beset by some problems in 1996, which disappeared in 1997 
(Table 4.B). From the late 1990s, low-level liquidity and concentration risks started to become 
apparent, derived basically from macroeconomic, liquidity and concentration imbalances. From 
2002, credit expansion and leverage took on medium levels of risk, which gave way to maximum 
alert in the second half of 2005. A similar pattern was seen in the other categories, although the 
date of activation of the alerts varied (second half of 2006 for liquidity, 2004 for concentration). 
The only exceptions are the indicators of incentives and moral hazard, which, as they are based 
on market variables, tend to be contemporaneous with crises. The macroeconomic imbalances 
built up continuously and substantially from 2003. The combination of the various risk indicators 
raised the aggregate indicator to the maximum alert in 2006.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
A  Pote?????
    risks
?????????????????
    a????everage
    Maturity
    a??????? ?? ???
    Concentration
    Incentives
    and mora????????
    Macroeconomic
????? ???ances
Aggregate
assessment
?????????
    conditions
    Re????conomy
    NPL and c??????
    bank funding
???????? ???? ???? ???? ??
????
???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ?? ????
???? ???? ?? ?? ???????? ???? ???? ???? ???????? ???? ???? ???? ???????? ???? ???? ???? ????
AGGREGATE HEAT MAP (a) TABLE 4 
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It should be highlighted, as indicated in the introduction, that the Banco de España had 
set in train dynamic or countercyclical provisions in 2000, maintaining them with the onset of 
IFRSs (International Financial Reporting Standards) in 2005, which allowed provisions to be built 
up throughout this strongly expansionary period that would otherwise not have been available 
as the crisis broke. What was involved here was a macroprudential instrument, a subsequent 
source of inspiration for the CCB, seminally applied in a period in which no other supervisor or 
central bank was using such instruments. Only after the crisis did the macroprudential dimension 
begin to be widely incorporated into banking supervision and public policies. 
Since the indicators are mostly leading indicators, the level of alert tends to decrease 
from 2008, as the onset of the crisis approaches. In the case of the recent crisis, this does not 
mean the risks would have disappeared, but that they were materialising rapidly both in the real 
economy and in terms of non-performing loans and increased funding from the central bank. 
That is to say, the indicators of actual conditions begin to worsen rapidly from the second half of 
2008 (Table 4.B). These effects are interrelated, insofar as the macroeconomic downturn has an 
adverse impact on the quality of bank assets. Subsequently, the general pattern shown by the 
heat map during the crisis was one of gradual correction of the potential risks, while the impact 
of the crisis translated into a severe cost in terms of actual conditions of the economy and of 
the banking system. 
Chart 1 summarises this behaviour by portraying the risks and the actual conditions, 
separating the real economy and the banking sector, in a cobweb chart at specifi c dates. In 
particular, this chart allows comparison of the situation in December 2006, before the crisis 
broke, with what may be considered its peak in December 2012. In December 2006 most of the 
potential risks were at maximum alert levels, but both the real economy and the levels of bank 
loan non-performance did not yet refl ect these latent risks. In 2012 the indicators of materialised 
risks worsened considerably, while potential risks underwent a sharp correction.
Credit 
Liquidity 
Concentration 
Incentives Macroeconomic imbalances 
Real economy 
NPL and central bank funding 
DECEMBER 2006 
DECEMBER 2012 
JUNE 2015 
  
  
COMPARISON OF THE HEAT MAP AT THREE KEY DATES CHART 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The chart depicts heat map levels. The concentric line nearest the centre of the chart represents the normal situation, and the risk level increases the greater the 
distance from the centre.
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4.2 Forward-looking analysis
Regarding the current situation (June 2015), the heat map (Table 4 and Chart 1) shows medium 
alerts in concentration and in actual conditions. The change in colour (from red to orange) in the 
heat map in the indicators of actual conditions (earlier in the economy and later in the banking 
sector) shows, on one hand, the return to the economic growth path, but still with a high level 
of unemployment; and, on the other, the turnaround in non-performing loans and the use of 
ECB credit facilities, both of which variables are on a clearly declining path, though still at higher 
values compared with pre-crisis levels (Chart 2). As is the case with unemployment, the level of 
non-performing loans is highly persistent over time, meaning that correction requires a longer 
period than other variables. 
In terms of potential risks (Table 4A), the adjustment of the imbalances which gave 
rise to the past crisis is continuing. Thus, the indicators linked to credit, the housing market 
and to debt and the ability to pay (fi rst block of Table 2, relating to credit growth and leverage) 
show, on average, a level of low risk (Chart 3). Hence, the decline in credit has now eased 
substantially, house prices are beginning to show positive rates of change and, although debt 
remains persistently high in historical terms, low interest rates have made interest payment 
easier and have slightly reduced the burden that debt repayment entails. 
In the category of transformation of maturities and market illiquidity (the second block 
of indicators), alerts disappeared during the fi nal quarter of 2014 thanks to the improvement in 
the aggregate loan-to-deposit ratio and to the increase in the proportion of overall liquid assets 
in the banking system (Chart 4.A). 
The concentration category still shows median levels of alert. As with other variables, the 
concentration in certain economic sectors, such as real estate development, has a considerable 
structural components which can only be corrected over longer timeframes (see Chart 4.B). 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The shaded area represents the crisis period.
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The systemic risk indicators based on market data (incentives and moral hazard block) 
show a substantial and continuous improvement with respect to the 2012-2014 situation, having 
stabilised at lower levels over the past year (Chart 5). This is largely due to improved fi nancing 
conditions in the debt markets and to the across-the-board reduction in market volatility (Chart 
5.B). As previously mentioned, these indicators are usually contemporaneous with the crisis. 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The shaded area represents the crisis period.
b Total credit to the economy, including both bank and other credit. The credit gap is calculated taking the difference between credit and a statistical trend estimated 
??? ?????????????????????????????
c The debt service of households is an estimate of their debt service burden given their disposable income (see Castro, Estrada and Martínez, Revista de Estabilidad 
Financiera, 27, 2014).
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a The shaded area represents the crisis period.
b Bank exposure to real estate construction and development loans is measured as a percentage of the total credit to other resident sectors.
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Finally, the macroeconomic imbalances category has been at a low level since 2011 
owing to the rapid correction during the crisis of the current account balance, which is the variable 
in this category with the most crisis-anticipation capacity (Chart 6.A). However, considerable 
risks persist owing to the Spanish economy’s heavy external indebtedness and to the increase 
in public debt during the crisis years (Chart 6.B). These potential risks have a limited impact on 
the heat map owing to the fact that they receive a lesser weight in the aggregation as they have 
a lower crisis early warning capacity; but it will be essential to monitor their course in the future 
owing to the potential adverse effects they may prompt.
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a The shaded area represents the crisis period.
b The probability of at least one bank failure in the Spanish banking system is estimated using a multivariate probabilistic model which combines information from 
the stock, credit derivatives (CDS) and equity derivatives markets.
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Accordingly, the indicators available do not signal risks requiring the activation of 
macroprudential measures in the short term. This is a consequence of the absence of warning 
signals by the indicators of potential risks and the fact that a favourable economic and fi nancial 
situation – the one still showing factors of vulnerability – is in place. In this respect, the appropriate 
direction of macroprudential policy is to maintain neutrality: to neither activate nor deactivate 
instruments (if previously activated). 
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5 Conclusions
This document has set out a general description of new macroprudential policy developments 
and of the analytical framework recently developed by the Banco de España for the monitoring 
of macroprudential risks through a broad set of indicators analysed using a heat map. This 
framework will serve as guidance for the broad macroprudential policy stance of the Banco de 
España, though not for the calibration of particular instruments, which will be done through a 
specifi c analysis in each case.
Along with the description of the methodology, the document has set out a heat map 
of the current situation. This heat map shows a low level of macroprudential alert, derived 
from the correction of a good number of the imbalances that caused the last crisis, both in the 
credit market and the housing market, and in terms of liquidity, incentives and macroeconomic 
imbalances. However, the Spanish fi nancial system is still emerging from a very severe crisis 
which has lasted over 5 years, meaning that actual conditions are still not optimal (e.g. declining 
but still high non-performing loans). As a result, the macroprudential indicators analysed by the 
Banco de España, and summarised in the heat map, are consistent with a neutral stance in 
macroprudential policy. 
Looking ahead, it will be necessary to ensure that the correction of past imbalances 
proceeds at an appropriate pace and that new imbalances do not emerge, against a backdrop 
of recovery in the Spanish economy. Also, it will be important to analyse at each point in time 
whether macroprudential policy may be appropriate for reducing existing threats or mitigating 
their possible impact, developing specifi c instruments or using existing ones, or, on the contrary, 
whether it is for other policies to deal with them. 
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